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Abstract We combine post-displacement survey data with information from
personnel ﬁles of a displacing ﬁrm in order to reveal sources of worker
heterogeneity in search time and wage losses. The Fokker Personnel Files and
Survey are described in detail. We develop a dynamic reservation wage with
updating. The method of updating is based on the simple idea that job seekers
are informed about successful matches of their former colleagues similar to
them. The data offer empirical support for the updating model.
Keywords Mass layoff ·Social networks·Unemployment
JEL Classiﬁcations J33·J63·J65·C42
1 Introduction
In this study, we analyze the effects of displacement for workers from a single
large ﬁrm in The Netherlands.1 Because of the ﬁrm’s bankruptcy, all workers
are ofﬁcially informed about their layoff at the same date. The data we use
contain detailed information on the accumulated human capital in relation to
1 We will not examine the wage losses per se. In another paper we show that wage losses 3 years
after displacement are quite heterogeneous, but on average in the order of magnitude of the U.S.
studies (Kriechel and Pfann 2005).
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the occupation held and the career developed within the ﬁrm. Together with
the workers’ hierarchical positions, their job characteristics, job rotations, and
promotions, we are able to thoroughly investigate the displacement process.
Using a post-displacement survey, we combine workers’ pre-displacement
occupational and career characteristics with speciﬁc information on the search
process and the eventual new job characteristics.
The combination of detailed pre- and post-displacement information of job
characteristics, wages, and search history allows us to develop and estimate a
simple model of dynamic updating of idiosyncratic asking wages or reservation
wages. The updating is a product of learning from information about successful
matches obtained by former colleagues with similar characteristics. The idea is
based on the observation that after the bankruptcy many former employees
became members of clubs where people met regularly (see also Granovetter
1974; Rees 1966). The updating model is strongly supported by the data.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data,
including the development of the post-displacement survey. In Section 3 we
propose a dynamic updating model to perform an integrated analysis of search
time and wage losses. In Section 4 we discuss the empirical results. Section 5
concludes.
2 The displaced worker survey and personnel data
After more than three quarters of a century in aircraft production the Dutch
company Fokker went bankrupt. Founded by one of the pioneers of aviation
and aircraft design, Anthony Fokker, the company ﬁrst blossomed in the
1920s when it became the world leader in aircraft construction, producing
in both The Netherlands and the United States. After the destruction of its
production facilities during the Second World War, Fokker remained one of
the smaller players in the world aircraft industry, producing predominantly
civilian mid-range airplanes of 50–100 seats. In March 1996 the company ﬁled
for bankruptcy and 5,644 workers lost their tenured jobs.
To salvage viable parts of the company the bankruptcy trustees created a
new company, called Fokker Aviation. A total of 953 workers were simul-
taneously made redundant from the bankrupt ﬁrm and rehired by Fokker
Aviation.2 Another group of 700 workers was offered a contract to continue
working for the trustees to ﬁnish off outstanding aircraft orders. All remaining
3,991 workers were permanently displaced. In 1998 we obtained access to the
personnel ﬁles of the bankrupt company for the years 1987–1996, and gained
the support of the bankruptcy trustees to survey the displaced workers.
2 The bankruptcy trustees sold Fokker Aviation to STORK in 1997. For a complete description
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2.1 The ‘Fokker survey’
To recover the work history of the workers after their displacement, a survey
was conducted. The survey was conducted to cover some information missing
from the otherwise rich personnel data of the company (with detailed infor-
mation on the search process, the ﬁrst employment after displacement, the
employer3yearsafterdisplacement,thenewfunction,salary,andemployment
conditions).
The questionnaire was developed and tested using focus group meetings
among a selected group of displaced workers who were subsequently excluded
from the survey. In total 38 workers participated in some form with the
development or pre-testing of the survey instrument. In addition, we sent
the full instrument with the intended accompanying letters to 100 randomly
selected workers as a pilot of the survey.
Given the breadth of functions within the company, the decision was taken
to send the survey to all displaced workers, taking a census rather than a
sample of the population. Current addresses of the respondents were obtained
from the bankruptcy trustees. Information from the Fokker Pension Fund
was used to check upon deceased employees. The addresses of deceased
former employees were omitted from the address ﬁles used for the survey.
All workers received the survey with pre-stamped return envelopes, with one
repeat. Some 2,279 workers responded. In following up 100 randomly selected
non-respondents, it was found that their labor force status did not deviate
signiﬁcantly from that of our respondents. The information from the mail-
survey has been linked to the information from the personnel ﬁles.
The mail-survey consisted of a 14-page questionnaire, pertaining to the
individual’s labor market history in the 3 years following the displacement
event. A respondent needed approximately 30 min to complete the ques-
tionnaire, excluding additional time needed to search for precise information.
Table 1 gives the composition of the workforce which were part of the survey
population. The questionnaire was sent out in April 1999 to all 5,506 workers
in the survey population (see Table 1). As noted, 2,279 ex-Fokker workers
returned completed questionnaires yielding a response rate of 41.4%. In
Table 1 Composition of Fokker workforce and survey population at the time of the bankruptcy
Number (N)P e r c e n t ( % )
Displaced workers 3,991 70.71
Bankruptcy trustees 700 12.40
Fokker Aviation B.V. 953 16.89
Total 5,644 100.00
Pilot 100 –
Other workers involved in the 38 –
development of the survey
Survey population 5,506 –
‘Other workers’ are those that have actively participated in the data processing of the personnel
ﬁles, pre-testing, or focus group meetings. They were excluded from the survey.138 B. Kriechel, G. A. Pfann
Appendix A, we report results of the non-response analysis. The survey results
are of high quality for a self-administered mail survey. We could validate some
of the given information by comparing the reported salary earned with Fokker
to the information available from the administrative ﬁles. Many respondents
were able to ﬁll in the exact amount of gross monthly salary which they earned
3 years prior to the survey. In a validation study for the PSID, Bound et al.
(1994) also ﬁnd reported wages to be rather accurate on average. The mean
error of log earnings found in this study was 0.007, which closely approximates
thatreportedinthepresentpaper(viz.0.006).Similarly,thestandarddeviation
of our sample is 0.34, which is only slightly higher than the standard deviation
of 0.32 reported in the PSID study.
The survey asked for information on the ﬁrst and the current job. Respon-
dents reported the date at which they started to work in the new position,
their starting wage and hours worked. Information was also collected on the
type of the new ﬁrm (e.g. name, industry, size). We categorize new employers
as belonging to the aircraft industry, other manufacturing industries, or non-
manufacturing. The respondents were asked to assess their responsibility in
their new job compared to that before displacement. On a ﬁve-point scale,
the middle category reﬂecting a similar level of responsibility, they could
indicate ‘more,’ and ‘much more’ responsibility on the one hand, or ‘less’
and ‘much less’ on the other hand. Furthermore, we collected information
on the prerequisites for the new job, as perceived by the respondent. The
response categories were fourfold: both the work experience and the technical
knowledge obtained while working at Fokker were necessary to obtain the
new job; either the work experience alone or the technical knowledge alone
was necessary to gain reemployment; neither category was strictly necessary;
and ﬁnally, neither category was at all necessary.
2.2 The personnel data
From Fokker’s personnel ﬁles we obtained information on each employee’s
type of job, compensation, and demographics. Demographic characteristics
include date of birth, gender, education, marital status, and the hiring date of
each employee. The average tenure at the time of bankruptcy was 15 years.
The ﬁrm’s hierarchy distinguishes eight different levels below top manage-
ment. The highest observable step, the eighth level, is just below the top
managementandtheBoardofDirectors.Forreasonsofpossibleidentiﬁcation,
the two upper levels (9 and 10) were left out of the data-set.
The hierarchical structure roughly reﬂects the division of unskilled versus
skilled workers as well as the organization of supervision. Production workers
are located in levels 1–3. Managers, engineers, and aircraft designers belong
to levels 4–8.3 Every position is ‘allocated’ to a job activity. These activities
are Administration; Sales; Management;Human Resources; R&D; Production
Preparation; Production Planning; Support; Production; and Quality Control.
3 For a detailed description of the company’s structure in 1987–1996 see Dohmen et al. (2004).Learning to update your reservation wage while looking for a new job 139
Job rotation is deﬁned as the number of lateral job changes within a given
hierarchical level. The lateral job change is a movement across job activities
without changing the hierarchical position to a higher (or lower) level job. In
addition to the normal tenure variable, we observe tenure within the hierarchy
and tenure within a speciﬁc position (job). The latter two tenure variables were
measured in months rather than years for the last position held before layoff.
We have calculated the unemployment insurance (UI) beneﬁts paid to the
worker, as well as the duration for which they were eligible. These calculations
were according to the Dutch regulations: On the day of the bankruptcy
every worker faces a 6-week ﬁring period in which they receive their salary.4
Older workers are entitled to a longer ﬁring period. The original 6 weeks are
extended by 1 week per year of tenure if the worker was older than 45 years.
The maximum ﬁring period after a bankruptcy is 19 weeks. After the ﬁring
period workers receive unemployment insurance beneﬁts. The unemployment
insurance pays 70% of the former salary up to a maximum of 55,000 Dutch
guilders. This implies a replacement ratio of 0.7 for all workers receiving
less than 78,752 Dutch guilders annually. Sixteen percent of our sample
received annual salaries above this amount leading to lower replacement ratios
for those workers. The length of the UI payments depends on the labor
market experience of the worker. A worker is entitled to UI payments if he
has worked 4 out of the 5 years prior to becoming unemployed. Workers who
worked for 4 years are entitled to 6 months of UI payments. After 5 years
worked, this rises to a total of 9 months, and to a total of 12 months after
10 years worked. Beyond 10 years of labor market experience a workers’
entitlement increases by an additional 6-month for every additional 5 years
he worked. The maximum entitlement is 60 months.
We use the 1993–1996 residuals of an unrestricted regression of the wage
growth as a proxy of the distribution of idiosyncratic worker ability at the time
of the mass layoff.5 If this measure is indeed a good proxy for unobserved
ability we expect it to be negatively correlated with search time.
3 Updating the reservation wage over time
Table 2 shows the evolution of the nominal wages of observed matches after
the bankruptcy. It reﬂects the downward sloping relation so often portrayed
in the search literature, and thought to result from the endogenous interaction
between search, duration of UI, adaptation of reservation wages, and hyper-
bolic discounting by the individual worker (Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002).
How the adaptation of the reservation wage over time actually takes place is
4 The salary payments after a bankruptcy are paid out by the Dutch social security ofﬁces. They
are guaranteed regardless of the expected bankruptcy outcome.
5 Farber and Gibbons (1996) as well as Altonji and Pierret (2001) suggest that idiosyncratic
worker ability is not readily observable. Residuals from wage growth regressions can be used to
proxy for this.140 B. Kriechel, G. A. Pfann










March 1996–May 1996 1,679 835 5,745
Time period 2
June 1996–August 1996 844 393 5,237
Time period 3
September 1996–November 1996 451 191 5,177
Time period 4
December 1996–February 1997 260 68 4,964
March 1997–May 1997 192 58 4,896
June 1997–August 1997 134 43 4,120
Time period 5
September 1997–November 1997 91 23 3,780
December 1997–February 1998 68 20 4,225
March 1998–May 1998 48 15 3,637
June 1998–August 1998 33 8 3,543
September 1998–March 1999 25 25 4,353
The ﬁrst three time periods refer to a 3-month period. The last period refers to the period
September1998until01.04.1999,whenthesurveywasconducted.Theﬁrstcolumngivesthepoolof
workers who are still unemployed (the risk-set) at the beginning of the period, the second column
gives the number of matches during the time period, and the last column gives the average wage
of the realized matches in the period.
not well explained in the literature. Although often referred to as ‘learning’
and modelled as a stochastic process accordingly, it remains unclear how
updating of the reservation wage actually occurs. Many view the adaptation
process as random, while some say it depends on individual wealth (Bloemen
and Stancanelli 2001). Randomness is often assumed to result from trial and
error. In fact, for this to work a job-seeker needs the input of a large sequence
of job-interviews. But invitations for interviews are rare, and once invited for
an interview the rejection probability is remarkably low: in our population of
workers 26.75% receive an offer which is rejected, and most of those workers
have received multiple offers around the same time. If anything, the process
should be one that is based on—often unobserved—unsuccessful applications
that determine the reduction of reservation wages over time until a successful
match is found.
Workers are at the point of displacement unsure about the wage offer
distribution that is available to them. Often they have high tenure and do
not orient themselves on the labor market. According to standard search
theory, however, workers set their reservation wage by optimizing over wage
offers they expect to elicit combined with the duration expected to take for
such an offer to arrive. If workers do not have precise knowledge about the
distribution of prevailing wages, a learning process could be assumed (Burdett
and Vishwanath 1988).Learning to update your reservation wage while looking for a new job 141
We propose a somewhat different and to our view more realistic method
of updating. Not only are workers updating their reservation wage because
of their own learning process over the prevailing wages as in Burdett and
Vishwanath (1988), but they also take into account the experience of their
former colleagues. Our method is based on the observation that after the
bankruptcy many former employees became or remained member of clubs
where former workers of Fokker meet regularly. Most of these clubs have a
recreational purpose—we counted 14 different clubs, varying from a bowling
club to a yoga club—and two more general interest organizations that are
responsible for the clubs’ activities. These are the ‘Association of Former
Fokker Employees,’ with 2,000 members, and the ‘Community of Interests of
Ex-Employees of Fokker,’ that had 1,100 members at the time we conducted
the survey. Thus our assumption is the following: Rather than basing the
consideration of when and by how much to adjust your reservation wage
on individual experiences alone, we suggest that people in these clubs and
organizations are informed about the successes and failures of people similar
to themselves and that this information is used for updating. Even though we
do not have information on who was a member and how often people met,
we do observe for every worker in the sample the characteristics of successful
matches. The process of peer updating is modeled in the following way:
Each updating process needs time. We call this a period, and we assume
that periods have similar lengths for all individuals. The risk set during each
period consists of all workers who are job-seekers at the beginning of the
period, Nt. A peer is deﬁned as a worker with observable characteristics,
Xit, being similar to job-seeker i in period t. Mt > 0 workers ﬁnd jobs during
period t. Their matched wages and wage losses are observed by all other
workers, and the wages of recently matched colleagues may be standing in
for unobserved variations in local labor market conditions. At the beginning
of each consecutive period the risk set has been reduced to Nt+1 = Nt − Mt.I n






;i ∈[ 1, N1]. (1)
where Wi1 is the last wage earned before displacement, and ¯ W−i1 is the average
of all last wages earned by the other workers subject to displacement from the
same ﬁrm.
In period t > 1, we order all job-seekers in the previous period t − 1 ac-
cording to the observed successes in ﬁnding a job during that period, starting
with the successful ones. Deﬁne ˆ Wjt−1 as the observed matched wage in
period t − 1 by the individual successful worker j, j ∈[ 1, Mt−1]. Deﬁne W∗
it
as the expected wage at the beginning of period t that would have been
obtained by worker i, i ∈[ Mt−1 + 1, Nt] if a successful match is believed – by
the job-seeker– tobeindependentofunobservableabilitydifferencesbetween
fortunate workers and unfortunate job-seekers with similar characteristics,142 B. Kriechel, G. A. Pfann









,i ∈[ Mt−1 + 1, Nt] , t > 1 ,( 2 )
W∗
it = Pr(It−1 = 1|Xit) · E[ ˆ Wit−1|Xit] (3)
¯ W∗










ˆ Wjt−1.( 4 )
To calculate RWit we need to specify how to obtain estimates for Pr(It−1 =
1|Xit) and for E[ ˆ Wit−1|Xit]. The ﬁrst component is estimated as a simple Probit
model of observed successful matches (It−1 = 1) and unsuccessful workers
(It−1 = 0) during period t − 1 given Xit. The assumed randomness of successful
matches among peers allows us to compute the simple OLS regression of
observed matches on characteristics Xjt, and use the estimated coefﬁcients to
compute the predicted wage E[ ˆ Wit−1|Xit]. Finally, we assume linearity for the









The parameters λt will be estimated using a piecewise-constant hazard model
suggested by Lancaster (1990) including the correction for heterogeneity as
suggested by Murphy (1996). The likelihood function for this model is given in
Appendix B.
4 Estimation results
We ﬁnd that the time support points are strongly signiﬁcant which indicates
that the hazard of leaving unemployment differs over the ﬁve-time periods.
Within the exponential-hazard model, the hazard itself is constant per time
period, while the support points allow the per period to differ.
Table 3 gives the estimation results. The relative wage position – which we
use to estimate the effect of learning on the reservation wage – is strongly
signiﬁcant in the second and third time period. It shows that in this period a
worker faces different hazards according to his relative wage position of the
group. All else equal they point to longer search for higher expected wages.
This conﬁrms the idea that workers learn over time and observe the matches
of their co-workers rather than trying to learn from their labor market failures
alone. Based on matches of their co-workers they extrapolate their chances of
ﬁnding a job and the market valuation of their skills. For the ﬁrst, fourth and
ﬁfth time period no signiﬁcant distinction can be made. Hence, learning will
not be important in these time periods. Intuitively one should consider thatLearning to update your reservation wage while looking for a new job 143
Table 3 Piece-wise constant hazard model
Coeff. s.d. zp
Time period 1 (t1) -7.262 0.296 -24.53 0.000
Time period 2 (t2) -7.532 0.299 -25.20 0.000
Time period 3 (t3) -8.789 0.326 -26.97 0.000
Time period 4 (t4) -6.363 0.293 -21.68 0.000
Time period 5 (t5) -5.700 0.279 -20.40 0.000
t1 * relative wage position 0.113 0.107 1.05 0.293
t2 * relative wage position 1.451 0.340 4.27 0.000
t3 * relative wage position 6.804 0.591 11.50 0.000
t4 * relative wage position -0.776 1.025 -0.76 0.449
t5 * relative wage position 0.301 0.918 0.33 0.743
Weeks of UI remaining: (0,4) 0.619 0.096 6.46 0.000
Weeks of UI remaining: [4,8) -0.456 0.159 -2.86 0.004
Weeks of UI remaining: [8,12) 0.123 0.124 1.00 0.319
Weeks of UI remaining: [12,26) 0.061 0.019 3.19 0.001
Weeks of UI remaining: [26,∞] 0.006 0.001 4.36 0.000
Age: <30 years 0.743 0.129 5.75 0.000
Age: 30-34 years 0.241 0.095 2.54 0.011
Age: 40-44 years -0.503 0.095 -5.30 0.000
Age: 45-49 years -0.916 0.121 -7.58 0.000
Age: 50-54 years -1.598 0.169 -9.45 0.000
Age: > 55 years -1.920 0.338 -5.69 0.000
Tenure -0.034 0.017 -2.04 0.041
Tenure2 /1,000 0.294 0.449 0.65 0.513
Hierarchical level 2 0.122 0.110 1.11 0.269
Hierarchical level 3 0.248 0.133 1.87 0.061
Hierarchical level 4 0.347 0.143 2.42 0.015
Hierarchical level 5 0.386 0.168 2.30 0.021
Hierarchical level 6 0.332 0.192 1.73 0.084
Hierarchical level 7 0.365 0.255 1.43 0.153
Hierarchical level 8 0.496 0.266 1.87 0.062
Predisplacement wage growth 0.484 0.280 1.73 0.084
Evaluation: unsatisfactory -0.602 0.298 -2.02 0.044
Evaluation: very good 0.211 0.069 3.07 0.002
Evaluation: excellent 0.424 0.116 3.67 0.000
WAO - % -0.013 0.003 -3.85 0.000
1/lnυ -13.881 185.741 -0.07 0.940
Subjects 1,613
t1 to t5 represent the time speciﬁc intercepts. Age is at the time of displacement. We also correct
for ﬁeld of activity within the displacing ﬁrm, the tenure in the ﬁeld of activity as well as in the
speciﬁc job, lateral movements across activities and gender.
knowing one’s position within the wage distribution, and knowing the wage
distribution allows the worker to optimally accept or decline wage offers. If
however, the position in the wage distribution, or the real wage distribution is
blurred, workers will not be able to make optimal decisions.
The learning in period two and three can also be understood by looking at
Fig. 1. The ﬁrst row gives the distribution of the predicted chance that a worker
will ﬁnd new employment based on the observed matches of the previous
period of his former colleagues. The second row presents the distribution of
expected (log) wages also based on observed matches of former colleagues.
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Fig. 1 Development of job expectations, predicted wages and wage expectations
the distribution of expected reservation wages. Note that the distribution is
dispersed in the second time period, while it gets more concentrated in the
later time periods.
In addition to the results on the importance of learning, or the relative wage
position in the expected wages, we also ﬁnd that higher hierarchical levels have
shorter search time. This is intuitive as workers who are working in higher
hierarchies usually have both more exposure to the working environment and
also survived an internal career selection, indicating that they are productive
workers. In a similar fashion, on a lower level, do the evaluations a worker
received before displacement indicate that workers who were excelling in their
position, or were evaluated to be ‘Very Good’ also perform better in ﬁnding
new employment, relative to average workers. Symmetrically, workers who
were evaluated as functioning poorly show a strong negative sign, implying
that they face longer search time. A similar factor is ‘WAO’, which gives an
individual worker’s previous (partial) work disability as a percentage of full
time equivalents.6 Workers who have been partially disabled to work show
longer search time.
6 A worker could be fully disabled, yielding 100% disability, or partially disabled resulting in
lower than full time working hours.Learning to update your reservation wage while looking for a new job 145
Age and tenure show the expected signs in that older, higher tenured
workers search longer after displacement. The weeks of unemployment insur-
ance also follow the expected pattern: the closer the individual is to beneﬁt
expiration, the higher the reemployment hazard.7
5 Conclusion
We combined survey data from displaced workers and their personnel records
from a bankrupt ﬁrm to investigate post-displacement differences in search
time. We propose a dynamic reservation wage model with updating. The
method of updating is based on the simple idea that job seekers are informed
about successful matches of their former colleagues. Allowing workers to
learn from the labor market experience of their former co-workers and peers,
they are basing their search strategy on matching results observed of workers
similar to them. We ﬁnd this information to be an important explanation of
the simultaneous dynamics of reservation wages and observed unemployment
durations. Search time increases with age and tenure. Workers with a higher
hierarchicalpositionsearchsigniﬁcantlylessthandolowerlevelworkers,while
the length of remaining UI negatively affects search.
Similar workers who found high wage jobs increase the unemployed peer
worker’s reservation wage as well as the predicted search time. Learning is
strong in situations in which the relative wage position can be easily identiﬁed
with some conﬁdence.
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Appendix A: A non-response analysis
We addressed the non-response issue as to make sure that the results of the
survey are reliable, veriﬁable, and representative of displaced workers. Two
methods are used. Firstly, we conducted a non-response follow up among 200
randomly selected non-respondents using a core question approach. Secondly,
7 One exception is the 4 to 8-week period which is due to the institutional character of the UI
legislation and the distribution of tenure, hence UI rights, in our data-set.146 B. Kriechel, G. A. Pfann
Table A.1 Employment status in 1999—response vs. non-response
Core question approach







we used weighted as well as unweighted estimations using information of non-
respondents from the personnel ﬁles. The idea of asking a limited number of
core questions for a follow up, was ﬁrst suggested by Bethlehem and Kersten
(1986) as a method of distinguishing between the group of non-respondents
who are simply unwilling to provide the detailed answers asked for in general
or speciﬁc surveys, and those unwilling to participate for reasons related
to the survey speciﬁcally. To learn about possible non-random selection a
limited number of core questions were asked to non-respondents by means of
telephone interviews. Given the information we already had about the respon-
dents and non-respondents from the personnel ﬁles, the core questions should
be sufﬁcient for identifying non-response bias. In Table A.1 the results are
given from the non-response follow up. We ﬁnd that the labor market status is
comparable between the respondents and the non-respondents. We conclude
that the non-response is randomly distributed with respect to (un)employment
status.
The second test examines the effects of known variables of both respon-
dents and non-respondents on the probability of response. To identify the
compositional differences between respondents and non-respondents we used
a simple Probit including all variables from the personnel ﬁles to examine
the differences between the respondents and the non-respondents. Having
predicted a probability of survey response allowed us to post-stratify the
sample outcomes with the inverse of the individual’s response probability.
From the core question approach we concluded that the group of non-
respondents seems to match the group of respondents with respect to the labor
market status. The additional examination of non-response behavior showed
that some variables8 signiﬁcantly predicted non-response. This implies that
non-response was not random. As the weighted estimation differ very little
from the unweighted ones, we report the unweighted results only.
8 Tenure of between 25 and 29 years (and of more than 30 years), populating salary scales 9
through 11, and being married and female all served to lower the non-response rate. On the other
hand, non-response rates were higher among workers aged 55 years or more, among those with
lower evaluations, as well as for those holding jobs in R&D and Production Planning and recruits
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Appendix B: The econometric speciﬁcation of the reservation wage
updating model
Following Lancaster (1990) we divide the observation period into M intervals,
let c1,c2,...,cM−1 denote the border of the interval. The hazard of a person i
for interval m c a nt h e nb ew r i t t e na s
θi(t) = μieλm, cm−1 ≤ t < cm, m = 1,2,..., M. (6)
Let μi = μ(Xi) = exp(Xiγ)and let us deﬁne an indicator dm such that,
dm(t) =

1 if cm−1 ≤ t < cm,
0 otherwise
This indicator identiﬁes the interval into which t falls. Let us further deﬁne
Dm(t) =
m
j=1[1 − dj(t)], m = 1,2,..., M − 1; D0(t) = 1. The variable simply
indicates whether t falls at or after cm.
Given possible heterogeneity due to some unobserved characteristics in
the true X∗, we follow Lancaster and Nickell (1980) and Murphy (1996)i n
assuming that the heterogeneity can be captured in the single random variable
υ with a distribution of function H(υ) and density h(υ). This is assumed
multiplicative in the hazard which thus becomes
θi(X∗
i ,t) = υμi · eλm. (7)
The hazard rate of person i for all M periods then becomes
θi(X∗






















The likelihood contribution of person i who is leaving unemployment or
censored at ti is







eλm[(ti − cm−1)dim + (cm − cm−1)Dim], (10)
with δ being an indicator variable that takes on the value one if the observation
is not censored and zero otherwise. In order to write the log-likelihood more
compactly, we deﬁne
Tim =[ (ti − cm−1)dim + (cm − cm−1)Dim].148 B. Kriechel, G. A. Pfann
















υμi · Tim. (11)
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